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NOTES.
CARRIERs-LIMITATIOX OF LIABILITY-TIME-LiMIT FOR PRE-
SENTING CL4i-ms--For many years the law has been well established
that a common carrier, can in its contract with a shipper demand
that notice of any loss of or damage to the shipment be given within
a specified time, otherwise the carrier's liability for the same to
cease. Vhile this principle has been universally recognized, there
have always been two questions primarily involved which have
produced a wide'range of dissension among the courts. In the
first place there has been considerable disagreement as to the reason-
ableness of time allowed for presenting. notice,' some courts holding
'Central, etc., Ry. Co. v. Soper, 59 Fed. 879 (1894).
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five days sufficient, others considering even thirty days unreasonable.
In the second place there has been difficulty in determining whether
the requirement had been waived by the carrier by certain conduct
on its part, and, if so, whether it were permissible. In the past
decade the old rules have been broken down by the regulations of
commerce authorized by the Constitution and effected by Congres-
sional act and the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
so that the law of shipper and carrier has been considerably altered.
Under the Interstate Commerce laws it is probably unlawful
today for a carrier to waive the requirements for presenting notice
when once it is included in its tariff. This was clearly shown a
few years ago by a Commission report: In the Matter of Bills of
Lading.2 Several railroads sought to be excused from enforcing
the condition as to time-limit because of a general misunderstanding
of the effect of state laws on the provision in their new bill of
lading. While the Commission granted the request from the neces-
sity of the situation when to do otherwise would "leave uncorrected
grossly unjust and widespread discriminations," it insisted that its
position in the matter was against such toleration of excuse by the
railroads. "When it becomes apparent to carriers that they can not,
ought not, or will not enforce the provisions contained in their
established tariffs, whether in regard to matters of the kind here
involved, demurrage, reconsignment, or other like practices, as well
as to rates, they should change their tariffs in the manner prescribed
by law so that their practices may be in conformity thereto. The
Commission has not the authority under the law to order them to
disregard their tariffs .... 3
This position of the Interstate Commerce Commission -was
strengthened by that taken by the Supreme Court of theitUnited
States in the recent case of Georgia, Florida and Alabama Wailway
Company v. Blish Milling Company.4 In that case, although notice
of loss had been given by telegraph, which the court deenied suffi-
cient, the carrier denied this, insisting that its sole notice jwas the
commencement of action by the shipper. The latter had urged that
the carrier in making a misdelivery of his flour had converted-it
and thus abandoned the contract. The court declared that the
effect of the stipulation could not be escaped by the mere form of
the action. The opinion of Justice Hughes is significant: "The
parties could not waive the terms of the contract under which the
shipment was made pursuant to the Federal Act;' nor could the
carrier by its conduct give the shipper the right to ignore these
terms which were applicable to that conduct and hold the carrier to
29 . C. C. 417 (1914).
'P. 419.
'241 U. S. z9o (t916).
'Act to Regulate Commerce.
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a different responsibility from that fixed by the agreement made
under the published tariffs and regulations. A different view would
antagonize the plain policy of the Act and open the door to the very
abuses at which the Act was aimed."'
Considering these recent expressions of law by high judicial
authority, it would seem that in future no carrier can ever waive the
time-limit condition. Both carrier and shipper are absolutely bound
by this as well as the other provisions in the tariff.
Furthermore, it is not improbable that it is now an administra-
tive question for the Commission whether the time allowed for
presenting notice is unreasonable. In any event the Supreme Court
of the United States has recently sustained a very short period in
the case of Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. v. McLaughlin,' there having
been no attack of the provision by the Commission. A unanimous
court held that a shipper who accepted a bill of lading which re--
quired that notice of loss or damage be filed with the companys
claim agent within five days from the time of the removal of the
stock shipped was bound absolutely by his agreement, which was
on its face unobjectionable and reasonable. This decision affirmed
the position taken by the court in two previous cases involving cattle
shipments. Thus, in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. 1I'all,' it was
held that such a time-limit for the presenting of notice wvas a condi-
tion precedent to the shipper's right of recovery, and it had to be
strictly complied with, although under the Carmack Amendment
notice to the connecting or delivering carrier was sufficient, since it
acted as agent for the initial carrier.
While the Commission and the Supreme Court of the United
States are thus developing the law in the field opened to their juris-
diction by the Constitution and Acts of Congress, the state courts
are continuing to handle the difficulties of this subject where intra-
state shipments are involved. For them the old law is little changed;
each court must decide for itself what is reasonable time and
whether or not the carrier can waive the provision. So recently,
in Phillips et al. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,' a ten day period was
held an unreasonable time-limit for presenting notice for deprecia-
tion in value of delayed carloads of berries. In such cases as this
the courts apply the test set forth by NMorton, J., in Cox v. Verinoni
Central Railway Company: " "The question of reasonableness or
unreasonableness does not depend on the possibility of giving notice
in a particular case within the time limited, but on the course and
'P. 197.
October Term, x9z6. Decided December 4-
241 U. S. 87 (t916). See also Cincinnati. New Orle'ans & Texas Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319 (1916).
'89 S. E. 1057 (N. C. 1916).
l49 X. E. 97 (Mass. 188).
NOTES
nature of the business, and on the time which ordinarily might be
expected to elapse, in the usual course of business before the shipper
or the consignee, with ordinary diligence, would be in a position to
make a demand on the defendant. If, applying these considerations,
the time within which the notice was to be given was reasonable, it
would furnish no excuse that in a particular instance it proved
insufficient."
It would seem, however, that with the gradual standardization
of the bills of lading and other forms of contract used between
shipper and carrier, the state courts would conform closely with
the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Supreme Court in deciding those cases where the Carmack Amend-
ment has not denied them jurisdiction. H.D. S.
CORPORTIONS-Ultra l'ires-POWER TO LEND MloNEY-The
term iltra vires as to acts of a corporation or acts purporting to
have been done by it, has been loosely used in several
senses.' Sometimes an act is said to be ultra vires with reference
to the rights of certain persons when the corporation can not
legally act without their consent, and it may be held ultra vires
with reference to some specific purpose when the corporation
can not perform it for the purpose. It is said that in these two
cases the right of the corporation to avail itself of the defence
will depend upon the circumstances of the case,2 but the courts by
resorting to the doctrine of estoppel have held the corpora-
tion which has received the benefits of a transaction to be precluded
from setting up the defence in so many instances as practically to
make the doctrine a mere nullity.3 A recent Georgia decision
4
exemplifies this class of case. There a statute provided that notice
of stockholders' meeting for the purpose of issuing bonds should
be published in some newspaper in the town or city where the prin-
cipal office was located, once a week for four weeks prior to said
meeting, and that stockholders should be duly notified. The court
held that even though statutory notice of meeting was not given and
one or possibly two persons holding but one share of stock were
not present at the meeting, the company would be estopped, as to
innocent purchasers for value, from setting up the defence that the
bond issue was void, all the statutory requisites being set forth on
the face of the bonds. It is patent that this act was one which the
'Miner's Ditch v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543 (1869).
'Georgia Granite Co. v. Miller, 87 S. E. 897 (Ga. 1x96).
2Western & Southern Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 156 Pacific 885 (Okla.
1916).
'Georgia Granite v. Miller, supra (note 2).
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legislature expressly authorized it to do, rather than an act beyond its
powers, the only matter sought to be taken advantage of, being an
irregularity in the exercise of the granted powerg. Thus, where a
corporation gave notes for the purchase of stock from its president,
in consideration of his resignation, the court, though holding that the
purchase was authorized by statute, said that even if there had been
a lack of consent of the stockholders, since the payee could not be
restored to statu quo, stock being reissued to the new president and
par value of stock reduced, the corporation benefited by the deal was
estopped to set up the defence of ultra vires.5 The United States Su-
preme Court has clearly laid down the rule that a corporation may
be estopped to set up an irregularity in the exercise of its granted
powers in a case where the board of directors of a railroad cor-
poration had power upon the petition of a majority of its stock-
holders to direct a guaranty of negotiable bonds of another corpora-
tion. Such negotiable guaranty executed by directors without assent
of stockholders, was held valid in the hands of bona fide purchasers
for value. 6 The court pointed out that there was a distinction between
the doing of an act beyond the scope of powers granted to it by law.
and an irregularity in the exercise of the granted powers.
In the primary sense of the term, an act ultra vires is an act be-
yond the chartered powers of the corporation, express or implied;7
and since the act is outside the purposes of its creation and con-
sequently beyond powers bestowed upon it by the legislature, it is a
void act, and no action can be maintained thereon by either party
against the other.8 This was the view taken by a recent Illinois case
in which a concern was incorporated toL construct a canal and main-
tain docks, piers, etc., possessing the -power to purchase and sell real
estate and to "employ it in such manner as it should determine." It
sold a lot to one Conkling, at the same time loaning him a sum of
money, taking a trust deed to secure payment for the lot and loan.
In a foreclosure bill against the borrmwer's trustee in bankruptcy, the
defence of ultra vires prevailed as to the money loaned, the court
holding that since the company had not built a canal, and in selling
its land it was taking steps to wind up the business, the loan did not
further the specific purposes for which the corporation was created,
thus excluding the power to loan from being deemed an implied
power.10 Three judges dissented on the ground that the loan was
'XVestern Ins. Co. v. Murphy, supra (note 3).
'Louisville Ry. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., x74 U. S. 552 (1899).
'Strickland -v. National Salt Co., 79 N. J. Equity 188 (1911).
$Mercantile Trust Co. of Ill. v. Kaster, i i 'N. E. 988 (Ill. 1916).
I Calumet and Chicago Canal and Dock Co. v. Conkling, 12 N. E.
982 (Ill. s9t6).
"North Ave. Building and Loan Ass'n v. Huber, 51o N. E. 312 (11.
1915).
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valid, since adapted to promote lawful corporate purposes, and even
if the act were held ultra vires, that defense could not be invoked to
work an injustice.11
It will readily be seen that the canal company was deprived of
its property and of any remedy to recover the extent of the loan, and
it is submitted that the force of the dissenting opinion is sef forth in
the language of the New York Court of Appeals, "That kind of
plunder which holds on to the property but pleads the doctrine of
ultra vires against the obligation to pay for it, has no recognition or
support in the law of this state.'1 Although the Federal courts are
in accord with the doctrine of denying an action upon the ultra vires
act, they permit a restitution to statuis quo, the party receiving the
benefit being compelled to return the value of the property received
albeit for an unauthorized purpose."1 3 This view was followed in."
the jurisdiction of our principal case, the court saying "Where a
contract is ultra vires, and a corporation has received money under it
which in equity and good conscience belongs to another and which it
ought to pay over, it is liable for it in an action for money had and
received, with interest after demand."' 4 The court that laid down
the Federal rule said about this right to recover, "To maintain such
an action is not to affirm, but to disaffirm the unlawful contract."'"
A stockholder may avoid the difficulties surrounding the com-
mission of an act ultra vires by enjoining same, as shown in the case
where the directors of a corporation organized to manufacture
cotton, were efijoined from paying insurance premiums on the life of
the president of the concern,10 likewise a stockholder may invoke the
aid of a court of equity to enforce a statutory right accruing to a
dissenting stockholder, upon stockholders voting to amend a con-
cern's corporate purposes, the contemplated acts being beyond the
granted powers of the corporation. But where all the stockholders
have consented to the borrowing of money for a wrongful purpose,
viz., to pay debt of a corporation in which it had no interest and the
execution of a mortgage to secure it, the corporation was held liable
as the aggregation of its stockholders.1 8 It will be noted that this
is the class of case adverted to in this article as being "ultra vires
with reference to some specific purpose when the corporation can
not perform it for that purpose," and that the corporation was
estopped from asserting the defence, it having received a valuable
"Leslie v. Lorillard, nio N. Y. sig (1888).
'Seymour v. Spring Forest Ass'n, 144 N. Y. 333 (1895). Cook on Cor-
porations, Vol. 3, Sec. 681, 7th Ed.
'Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman, i39 U. S. 24 (i8go).
"Lehigh v. Brake Beam Co., 2o5 IIL 147 (19o3).
" Transp. Co. v. Pullman, supra (note 13).
NVictor v. Cotton Mills, 61 S. F. 648 (N. C. igog).
" Teele v. Rockport Granite Co., 112 N. E. 497 (Mass. 1917).
"Taylor Feed Pen v. Taylor .at'l Bank, 181 S. W. 535 (Texas 19r5).
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consideration for the execution of the note and mortgage and not
having tendered back same. In this case, the right to borrow money
was properly held an implied power of the private trading cor-
poration. Some courts, however, carry the doctrine of implied
powers very far, holding any lawful act done by the accredited
officers with a view to serving corporate ends, not prohibited by
charter, ultra vires.19 This view was specifically applied to a sub-
scription to a fund for locating new industries in a city by a brew-
ing concern having its factory and principal place of business there-
in, the corporation being compelled to pay its subscription.
20 It is
submitted that this attitude, though getting away from the strict con-
struction of corporate powers laid down in the Calumet Dock Co.
case, is, after all, the better view, since tending to obviate difficulties
and injustice resulting from a holding that such an act were ultra
vires.
C.B.W.
DA,%MAGES-'MAF-SURE IN CONTRACT AcTIONs-In an action for
damages for a breach of contract, it may be laid down as a funda-
mental principle of the American and English systems of law that
the basis of recovery is compensation for the loss suffered by the
plaintiff." This basis, however, is subject to two qualifications:
the loss must come as a natural consequence of the breach-or be
in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was formed
2
-and must be capable of reasonably certain proof, both as to
amount and cause.3 With these principles in -existence the courts
have possessed a comparatively sure rule for the measure of dam-
ages in contract actions; and with such a modus operandi have
attained a greater uniformtiy in its application to- particular cir-
cumstances than would have been possible had the matter rested
entirely in the discretion of either the judge or the jury. This was
one of the difficulties of the early English courts,4 when the Anglo-
Saxon system was in use-there was no certain rule, and it was
even variable as to whether the matter of compensation was wholly
in the hands of the judge or the jury. So, too, the civil law is
open to the same criticism.' The damages rest in the discretion of
the court, and each case must be decided solely on its own facts.
"Winterfield v. Brewing Co., 7 N. W. ioi (Wis. 1897).
2'Huntingdon Brewing Co. v. McGrew, 112 N. F.. s34 (Ind. 19T6).
2i Sedgwick. Damages (8th Ed.), p. 29.
2Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (Eng. i854).
a Sedgwick, Damages (8th Ed.), p. 245.
'Ibid., p. 20.
'Ibid., p. 25 ff., citing Domat, Loix Civiles; and Pothier, Traite des Obl.
I It would appear that in Scotland. profits may be recovered on much
the same theory as in the civil law-the jury looks at all the circumstances.
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Even though they have this more definite rule, the American and
English courts are still faced with the difficulty of its application.
And in no case is this better illustrated than in the matter of profits.
Are profits recoverable in a contract action? And if so, is the
recovery unlimited? There can be little doubt that in the early
part of the nineteenth century it was generally considered that
profits did not form a part of a plaintiff's schedule of damages.'
Yet even in the early cases there is at least a hint of the distinction
that later was made between gains that surely would have resulted
had there been no breach, and those which were merely speculative.
This distinction is now drawn, more or less sharply.8 Since the
ruestion of damages now rests on the broad principles of being
naturally resultant from the breach, and being reasonably certain,
whether profits are recoverable has become largely a question of
certainty of proof.9
This requisite of certainty does not necessarily arise in proving
the amount of the profits. Often the principal discussion centers
around the point of whether there would have been any profits2 0
So that the fact that a plaintiff can name and prove a certain .sum
does not mean that he will necessarily recover that sum. Thus, the
anticipated profits from a speculation which has been prevented
through the negligent conduct of a railroad or telegraph company
are generally considered too uncertain-not as to amount, but as to
their being attained by the plaintiff.1  In this connection, two cases
are worthy of special attention. One,12 an English case, is gener-
ally cited as standing for this principle-that speculative profits are
too remote to be recovered.. Yet that was merely intimated by the
court, not being argued, and as a fact the plaintiff recovered the
value of a prize for which the defendant's neglect prevented him-
from competing. The other case,'8 which was based on the former,
seems to stand for the abstract principle that under similar condi-
tions there can be a recovery of the value of the prize. These
Watt v. Mitchell, Cas. in Ct. of Session r157 (Scotland 1839); Dunlop v.
Higgins, i H. L 381 (Eng. i848)-decided according to the law of Scot-
land.
'Archer v. Williams, 2 C. & K. 26 (Eng. 1846); The Amiable Nancy, 3
Wheat. s46 (U. S. x818); Hale, Damages (2d Ed.), p. io3.
'Sherman Center Town Co. v. Leonard, 46 Kan. 354 (187); Stevens v.
Yale, 113 Mich. 68D (1897).
I Sedgwick, Damages, p. 251 ff.
" Brown v. Smith, 12 Cush. 366 (Mass. 1853) ; Aber v. Bratton, 6o Mich.
357 (1886).
" Leonard v. N. Y. A. & B. Electro-Magnetic Tel. Co, 41 N. Y. 5
(i8;o); W. U. Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444 (8887).
0Vatson v. Ambergate N. & B. R. Co., 85 Jur. 448 (Eng. 185,).
"Adams Express Co. v. Egbert, 36 Pa. 360 (186o).
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exceptions are interesting in that they typify the difficulties of courts
in deciding this question without any definite rules."
A recent case on a particular branch of this subject is Johnson
v. Braham.15 There the question arose between the principal and
her agent as to whether the latter was liable, by his negligence, for
the profits she might have made save for his act. And it was there
hel d that the true measure of damages is the loss that would have
been avoided sav.e for the agent's negligence, and not the amount
the- principal might have made.e In cases of this character the
-agent must pay- t.ie ictual loss which necessarily results." While
'in this case thi" principal was. allowed to recover for loss of time,
that would come under the general principles applicable to contract
actions generally-that the measure is the actual and proximate
results, provable with some certainty, arising from the breach of the
contract.
R.T.B.
EvIDENCE-OFFICIAL RECORDS-COROXER'S INQUEST-In a
very recent case not yet reported the verdict of a coroner's jury was
sought to be introduced as evidence that the deceased had met his
death in the manner alleged by the plaintiff. Upon the point at issue
the authorities, while by no means equally divided, are conflicting.
The reasons for the admission of the verdict of the coroner are
thus stated by Starkie: 1 "Such inquisitions are of a public nature,
and, taken under competent authority to ascertain a matter of
public interest, are, upon principles already announced, admissible
in evidence against all the world. They are very analogous to
adjudications in rein being made on behalf of the public; no one is
properly a stranger to them and all who can be affected by them
usually have the power of contesting them." Such seems to be the
English practice today.
.CIn America the result of the cases can be thus summarized.(r.n homicide cases the verdict of the coroner is clearly inadmis-
sible in every state in the Union except Louisiana. In the last they
are merely admitted as proof of death. The verdict of the coroner,
"While these rules were formulated in Hadley v. Baxendale, sutra,
they have been generally accepted since that time. with little, if any, addition.
See. Cory v. Thames Shipbuilding Co., L R. 3 Q. B. 181 (Eng. 1868);
Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489 k1858); Clyde Coal Co. v. P. & L E. R.
R. Co., 226 Pa. 39i (i9io).
15 15 L T. 76 (Eng. 1916).
"In ace. Chr. Salvesen Co. v. Rederi Aktiebolaget Nordstjeman, 92
L T. 575 (Eng. 19o5); Bell v. Cunningham, 3 Pet. 69 (U. S. 1830).
"'Cassaboglou v. Gibbs, 48 L T. 850 (Eng. 1883); Mayne, Damages
(8th Ed.), p. 641 ft.
' Treatise on Evidence, ioth Ed.. p. 403.
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it is generally held, is merely advisory to the officers charged with
the execution of public justice. . . It has no probative effect
and is binding upon no one as a judgment. It can prejudice the
rights of no one and is therefore not subject to be reversed, set
aside or quashed in a superior court, either at the instance of the
party accused by it or by any other person.2 A verdict of guilty by
a coroner's jury is of equal value with the indictment of a grand
jury or a sworn complaint before a magistrate. is not even
prima facie evidence against the accused on trial. .
.l The chief objectioxil, to its admission in a criminal action are
ovious. The inquest'Ts an ex parte proceeding; it affords no
opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses against
him, and, in the last analysis, it is merely .the opinion of a petty
judicial.or quasi-judicial officer upon a fact in issue before the
court.4 tTestimony rendered before him will be reiterated before
the court, besides a great deal of other evidence which the passage of
time and the diligence of counsel may bring forth. "To admit the
verdict of a coroner rendered in the absence of the accused, without
the aid of counsel and often in the absence of the most material wit-
nesses . . . to influence and perhaps to control the verdict of
the jury, would lead to a subversion and a final overthrow of the
jury system."
:1 (2) In life insurance cases the great majority of states, Illinois,
Iowa and *Mississippi excepted, reject the coroner's verdict. iThe
Illinois doctrine is best summarized in The United States Life In-
surance Co. v. Bocke.6 In that case, it may be noted, the Supreme
Court reversed because of the failure of the lower court to admit
the verdict. The Illinois decisions, however, have been put by
some of the text writers on the Illinois practice of sealing the record
of the inquest and filing it with the court.7 The courts which have
rejected the verdict have done so on various grounds. They have
distinguished the American inquisition from the English and have
pointed out that the former is not a judicial proceeding.8 In addi-
tion, it has been urged that as a matter of evidence a coroner's.
proceeding is res inter alios acta, and upon no rule of evidence should
'Smalls v. State, io1 Ga. 57o 0897).
'Cresfield v. Perrine. I5 Hun 2oo (N. Y. 1878).
'Colquit v. State, xo7 Tenn. 381 (igo).
'Whitechurst v. Commonwealth, 79 Vt. 55 (19o7).
1--9 I1. Sup. 557 (1889).
Foster v. Shepherd, 258 I1. 164-182 (1913).
In Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Lewin, 24 Col. 43 (1897), the court
said: "It is claimed that the requisitions by coroners were admissible in
evidence at common law, and hence now admissible in jurisdictions where
the common law rule has not been changed by statute. The English rule,
however, grew out of the fact that the inquisition was a judicial proceed-
ing authorized by statute, but this reason is without force-under our systems
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it be admissible against a third party, stranger to the proceeding.'
The purpose of the inquest is merely to detect crime and to take
the preliminary steps to secure a trial of the supposed offender.1
It may not be public; none but counsel for the state and for the
accused have a. right to examine the witnesses, and there is no
means by which the" findings may be reversed or set aside." "In
case of death under. suspicious circumstances or resulting from an
accident, the -rule Oermitting inquisitions to be used in evidence
would result in -a race and scramble to secure a favorable coroner's
verdict that woUld "influence and perhaps control in case
suits should be instituted against life insurance companies upon
policies of insurance and in.- cases of. accidents occurring as a result
of negligence on the part of.-corporations operating railroads, street
car lines, mining of coal or precious metals, etc. Law writers of
late have frequently animadverted upon the carelessness with which
such inquests are frequently conducted, and to allow inquisitions to
be used in a suit between private parties upon a cause of action
growing out of the death of the deceased would introduce an element
of uncertainty into the practice which would be contrary to public
policy and pernicious in the extreme." 12 A number of the courts
have stressed the fact that the purpose of the American inquisition
is merely to ascertain the cause of death with a view to a criminal
prosecution should the jury find that death had been caused by
unlawful violence.1 t
_S It is submitted that upon no principle of lawpr of public policy
should such a verdict be admitted in a civil suit. k'The question must
be decided ultimately in any jurisdiction with reference to the func-
tions of the coroner under the local statutes. The curious evolution
of the coroner's office, from a judicial post of no mean importance
to a petty administrative position, must be kept in mind. In a few
states it still retains something of its former usefulness; in a large
majority of American jurisdictions, however, it has been relegated
to insignificance in the administration of the criminal law. In not a
few, its total abolition has been seriously urged by Bench and Bar;
B.W.
of government. Moreover, under our constitution no part of the-judicial
power of a state could be vested in the coroner, and hence the inquisition
sought to be introduced into this case was extra-judicially taken and should
have been excluded."
I Boehme v. The Woodmen of the World, 85 S. W. 445; affirming 84
S. W. 422 (Texas 19o4).
" State v. The County Commission s4 Md. 426 (i88o).
u Boehme v. The Woodmen of the World, supra, n. 9.
"Germania Life Tns. Co. v. Lewin, spra, n. &
"Miller v. Cambria County, 2-9 Pa. Super. Ct. 66 09o5).
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ST.ATUTE!S-INTERPRETATION-PRACTICE OF NIEDICINE-CIIRIS-
TIAN SCIENcE-What is meant by the practice of medicine
and surgery within the meaning of state statutes controlling and
regulatin the right to engage therein, and whether a Christian
Science healer is comprehended, must depend in most instances
upon the words of the statute and the nature of the treatment
given. Where the statute defines the practice of medicine or sur-
gery to be the "prescribing, directing, or recommending any drug
or medicine or other agency for the treatment or relief of
regulating the right to engage therein, and whether a Christian
Science healer, consisting of prayer for divine assistance and the
encouragement and direction of the thoughts of the patient, is not
practicing medicine within such statute .and does not render the
party liable for the penalties prescribed for non-compliance with its
provisions. The ordinary meaning of the words, "practice of medi-
cine and surgery," when used alone and not enlarged by additional
terms, has been held not to include the practice of Christian Science
healing.1 The statute may, however, enlarge the ordinary and usual
meaning of the words to include other persons. Thus, a statute,
regulating the practice of medicine which provides that "any person
shall be regarded as practicing medicine within the meaning of this
act who shall operate on, profess to heal, or prescribe for or other-
,wise treat, any physical or mental ailment of another," has several
times been held to include Christian Science healers.2 If the words
of the statute are "treatment of whatever nature," it would seem
that it is sufficiently broad to include the mental treatmerit of a
Christian Scientist.*
In People v. Cole, which came before the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York a few years ago,4 a Christian
Science healer was convicted of a violation of the statute regulating
the practice of medicine.5 The statute defined one who practices
medicine as being "a person who holds himself out as being able to
diagnose, treat, operate or precribe for any human disease, pain,
injury, deformity or physical condition, and who shall either- offer
or undertake, by any means or method, to diagnose, treat, operate
or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or
physical condition." In a well-considered opinion the court con-
Evans v. State, 6 Ohio N. P. i29 (1898) ; State v. Mylod, 2o R. I.
632 (I898). In Kansas City v. Baird, 92 Mo. App. 2o4 (19o2), a.statute
requiring all physicians to report cases of contagious diseases was held not
to apply to a Christian Science healer.
'State v. Buswell, 4o Neb. 158 (1894); Smith v. People, 51 Col. 27o(xgtx).
eState v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 2z (igos), in which the court said: "If
its followers call it treatment they ought not to be heard to say it is not."
' 163 App. Div. 292 (N. Y. 1914).
'New York Public Health Law, See. 16t.
61bid., Sec. 16o, subd. 7.
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cluded that, although the defendant denied the material existence of
disease and said it was merely mental, yet he undertook to treat
the people he called patients for what they told him was the matter
with them, and was comprehended by the words of the act. But a
further complication arose in that the act specifically provided that
it should not be construed to affect the practice of the religious
tenets of any church.7 On this point the court decided that the
exercise of the art of healing for a compensation, whether exacted
as a fee or expected as a gratuity, could not be classed as an act of
worship done in the performance of a religious duty. One has no
authority to go into healing commercially for hire, using prayer as
the curative agency or treatment, under the cover of religion or a
religious exercise. As the -court said: "Defendant was engaged in
a business venture, not a religious exercise, and religion cannot be
used as a shield." Under this construction, the exception of the
practice of the religious tenets of any church would only be applied
to such doctrines and beliefs as are carried out under the roof of
the church itself.8 The results reached by the court had already
been arrived at in a number of earlier cases involving much the
same definition of the practice of medicine and containing the same
exception of the practice of the religious tenets of any church.9
People v. Cole was taken on appeal to the Court of Appeals of
New York, and the decision that the Christian Science healer was
practicing medicine under the statute and was not saved by the
exception made of the practice of the religious tenets of any church,
was recently reversed by that court?0 The higher court agreed that
the defendant was within the-broad wording of the statute which
defined the practice of medicine,11 because he did "treat" the
patient by "any means or method." But they were of the opinion,
withet much argument, that he was specifically protected by the
'Ibid., Sec. 173.
'But in People v. Spinella, i5o N. Y. App. Div. 923 (1913), the defend-
ant, who held himself out as curing all sorts of diseases through miraculous
power, had a church of his own and gave his treatment in front of the
altar. Upon appeal counsel squarely raised the point that defendant's acts
had been done in the practice of the religious tenets of a church and in-
voked the exception contained in Section 173 of the Public Health Law,
but the conviction was unanimously sustained. A possible explanation might
be that the defendant was considered a fraud and his religious belief a
mere sham. The case is not reported fully, but the facts are 'stated in the
first opinion of People v. Cole, jupra, note 4, at p. 310.
'State v. Peters. 87 Kan. 265 (912). a practitioner of Suggestive Thera-
peutics: Smith v. People. 51 Col. 270 (1911), a healer of the sick and mem-
ber of the Divine Scientific Healing Mission. The decisions of these cases
would apply equally to the case of a Christian Science healer. Also. note 3,
jupra.
113 N. F- 790 (Oct. 1916).
"Sec. i6o, subd. 7. ,
NOTES
exception made thereto,"2 and that it was for the jury to determine
whether or not he was in good faith practicing the tenets of the
Christian Science church. The court practically took. the view
that it was the intention of the legislature to relieve members of
the Christian Science and other churches from the provisions of
the statute.
The questions presented by the few cases which have arsen on
this subject are not without difficulties. Should Christian 'Science
healing be considered to be the practice of medicine and thus be
controlled by state statutes regulating such practice? If it should
be, then is it not excluded from the state statutes by a provision
that the act shall not be construed to affect the practice of the
religious tenets of any church? And again, if it should be, then'will the state be powerless to punish a father for violation of -a
statute requiring him to provide medical attention for his sick
child, if he has called in a Christian Science healer and the child
has died? While.if it should not be considered practice of medi-
cine, then are we not neglecting the primary object of state laws
regulating medical practitioners, namely, to secure the safety and
protect the health of the public by providing competent persons to
determine the nature of, and prescribe remedies for, disease?
After having taken the affirmative stand, the first difficulty
mentioned above, and the one upon which the New York case was
finally decided, presents much to be said on either side. In suppoit
of the view that such a provision does exclude a Christian Science
healer from amenability to the state medical act, the argument
naturally arises that the words of the exception could mean nothing
else. The tenets of a church are the beliefs, doctrines, and creeds
of that church, of an organized body as distinguished from an indi-
vidual. It is a tenet of the Christian Science church that prayer
to God will result in complete cure of disease, and the practice of
such a tenet would be directly saved by the exception. And the
fact that the Christian Science church is in terms expressly excepted
from the prohibitions contained in the medical practice acts of many
of the states might also be used to throw light on the probable like
intention of legislatures in framing the exception which we are con-
sidering.13  But on the other hand, the argument which led the New"
York court to reach an opposite conclusion in the first opinion is
very convincing. The court admitted that any person or any church
may resort to prayer whenever they wish for the healing of the
sick, but contended that a business venture was not a religious exer-
cise. None of the indicia of worship were present in the treatnents,
"Sec. 173.
" These states are Maine. New Hampshire. Massachusetts, Connecticut,
North Carolina, North and South Dakota, Kentucky, Tennessee and Wis-
consin.
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which were not had in a place of religious worship, nor in any build-
ing connected therewith, in which case only such acts would have
come within the saving clause of the statute. 14 The whole difficulty
arises from the fact that healing would seem to be the one prominent
and distinctive tenet of the Christian Science Church."'
As to the second difficulty, it has been repeatedly held thaf a
person who relies on the efforts of a Christian Science healer to
save the life of his sick child can be convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter for his neglect to provide medical attendance as required
by statute.16 It seems never to have occurred to counsel or judge
in any of these cases that by -calling in the Christian Science healer
the father had called a physician and was therefore not guilty of a
violation of the statute. ft.is submitted that such a defense would
have been sunmarily disposed of, had it been attempted, yet the
apparently illogical situation exists.
And finally, upon the last question advanced, there may, and
does, exist a vigorous difference of opinion. It may well be argued
that Christian Science healing is not the practice of medicine. As
ordinarily and popularly understood, the practice of medicine has
relation to the art of preventing, curing, or alleviating disease or
pain, and consists in the discovery of the cause and nature of dis-
ease, and the administration of remedies or the prescribing of treat-
ment. Obviously the popular conception of the practice of medicine
would require stretching in order to include Christian Science."
Moreover, it will be found that the doctrines and beliefs of that
church negative the very existence of disease as a physical fact and
affirm that what is ordinarily recognized as the presence of disease
is simply evidence of a lack of harmonious relation with the
"People v. Cole, supra, n. 4, at p. 317. the court says: "But where a
person opens a business office disconnected from any place of worship, and
in surroundings incongrous with any idea of sacrifice and prayer, and for
pecuniary consideration furnishes such services as he undertakes to give,
then it is no longer a question of one's following the tenets of his religion,
but of one's engaging in a purely commercial pursuit, which has brought
in to this defendant an income of from $5ooo to $6ooo a year."
"'For this reason the Pennsylvania courts have refused to allow Chris-
tian Science churches to incorporate. It is held that their purpose is not
merely to inculcate a creed or establish a form of worship, but also to
treat and cure diseases through healers whom they train and constitute,
and it is for that reason contrary to the public policy of the state as ex-
pressed in the laws relating to the practice of medicine and surgery, and
the safety and protection of the public health. First Church of Christ
Scientist Application. 6 Pa. Dist. 745 (1897) ; First Church of Christ Scientist,
205 Pa. 543 (1903).
"Commonwealth v. Brett, 44 Pa. C. C. .6 (ioi6): Commonwealth v.
Hoffman, 29 Pa. C. C. 65 (10o3) : People v. Pierson. 176 N. Y. 2or (19o3);
State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. ()4 (194o); Rex v. Brooks, 9 Brit. Col. 13
(igo2) : Reg. v. Senior (1899), I Q. B. 283.
"State v. Mylod, 20 R. I. 632 (i8g8).
NOTES
Almighty. The healer makes no diagnosis and disavows Al per-
sonal ability or power to influence or affect the condition of the
person seeking relief. He emphasizes the fact that God is the only
healer and that prayer to God is the only efficacious means of relief.
Without going further into the church's doctrines, the difficulty of
sustaining the contention that a Christian Science healer is prac-
ticing medicine will readily be seen.18 Yet it will be just as readily
seen that to hold otherwise would be directly antagonistic to the
spirit and purpose of these state medical acts, the objects of wihich
are to secure the safety and protect the health of the public. The
law regards disease as a fact, and these statutes are based upon the
assumption that to allow incompetent persons to determine the
nature of disease and prescribe remedies would result in injury and
loss of life. The subject of such legislation is not really medicine
and surgery, but rather the public health, in aid of which the laws
make the right to undertake the treatment of disease dependent
upon the possession of reasonable qualifications.
The whole question is fraught with the great difficulty that,
while Christian Science is a religious belief and is accordingly
entitled to the protection given by federal and state constitutions
regarding freedom of religious belief, its principal tenet seems to
be that of the art of healing, a subject which is embraced-within the
police power of the states as being closely concerned with the public
health. Just how the courts will deal with Christian Science in the
future is more or less a matter for speculation, and time alone will
clear up the difficulties here adverted to.
P.H.R.
'In the first opinion of People v. Cole, supra, n. . Judge Dowling
wrote a strong dissenting opinion based upon the view that the Christian
Science healer negatives the very existence of disease as a physical fact.
